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Catastrophic Oil Spills and the
Problem of Insurance
Kenneth S. Abraham

64 Vand. L. Rev. 1769 (2011)

The BP oil spill of 2010 focused considerable attention
on the operating conduct of BP, on the potential liability of BP
and other entities associated with the spill, and on the fund
that BP established to provide compensation to victims of the
spill. Much less attention has been paid, however, to the nature
and scope of insurance covering losses caused by catastrophic
environmental disasters such as oil spills. BP's establishment
of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, and the compensation that
will be paid by that facility, will likely dampen awareness of
the mismatches between the resulting losses and the insurance
available to cover such losses. What might otherwise have been
a very dramatic demonstration of the ways in which our
insurance and liability systems fall short in such situations
will probably be much more muted. Future spills, however,
may not follow this pattern. Understanding the structure of
insurance and liability that are and are not available when
spills occur is therefore critical to developing satisfactory
approaches to dealing with the consequences of spills. This
Article identifies the matches, and mismatches, between the
losses resulting from oil spills, the insurance available to the
victims of spills, the liability of the parties responsible for
losses caused by spills, and the insurance available to the
parties who face such liability. The Article then attempts to
make sense of the situation it has identified, considering three
explanations for the mismatches: difficulties associated with
proving the cause of pure economic loss, traditionalchallenges
to the insurance of pollution loss and liability, and preexisting
portfolio diversification by potential spill defendants that
discourages the purchase of large amounts of insurance.
Finally, the Article critically analyzes two proposals that have
been made for remedying the insurance mismatches in this

field: the imposition of an ex ante drillers' tax on the amount of
their potential liability in excess of their combined assets and
liability insurance and the imposition of mandatory liability
insurance requirements far in excess of the amounts of
insurance that are currently availableor purchased.
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INTRODUCTION

The BP oil spill of 2010 has focused considerable attention on
the operating conduct of BP, on the potential liability of BP and other
entities associated with the spill, and on the fund that BP established
to provide compensation to victims of the spill.' Much less attention
has been paid, however, to the nature and scope of insurance covering
losses caused by catastrophic environmental disasters such as oil
spills. The availability (and unavailability) of insurance covering such
losses is worthy of separate consideration.
Some forms of civil liability precede the development of
insurance. These forms of civil liability create a demand for insurance
coverage, and a market offering this insurance arises. That was how
employers' liability insurance developed before the adoption of
workers' compensation, how products liability insurance came into
being, and how insurance against environmental liability was first
provided. 2 In contrast, other forms of liability are not adopted until the
development of applicable insurance coverage. This happened in
connection with a number of no-duty and immunity rules in
negligence law. Courts did not expand liability for certain forms of
injury arising from dangerous conditions on real property or from
children's negligence, for example, until insurers offered coverage of
3
such liability.
Interestingly, catastrophic oil spills present a situation that
does not comfortably fit either of these patterns. It turns out that firstparty property insurance usually does not cover most forms of
property damage caused by pollution. As to economic losses resulting
from pollution, although one of the rationales for limiting the scope of
tort liability for pure economic loss is that first-party insurance
against these losses is available, 4 first-party business interruption
insurance tends not to cover many of the pure economic consequences
of pollution. Similarly, the potential for the imposition of pollution
liability has generated longstanding interest in insurance coverage
against the losses resulting from pollution. Despite the demand for
insurance coverage of pollution liability, however, such insurance is
1.
Information about BP's compensation fund, the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, can be found
at the facility's website, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com.
2.
See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT
LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 149-52 (2008).

3.
Id. at 180-86.
4.
See, e.g., Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by
Negligence:A PragmaticAppraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 53 (1972).
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not generally offered. Standard-form liability insurance policies
certainly do not provide it.
In short, there is a mismatch between the losses resulting from
oil spills, the insurance available to the victims of spills, the liability of
the parties responsible for losses caused by spills, and the insurance
available to the parties who face such liability. BP's establishment of
the Gulf Coast Claims Facility and the compensation that BP will pay
out through that facility are likely to dampen awareness of these
mismatches. What might otherwise have been a very dramatic
demonstration of the ways in which our insurance and liability
systems fall short in such situations will probably be much more
muted. Future spills, however, may not follow this pattern.
Understanding the structure of insurance and liability that are and
are not available when spills occur is therefore critical to developing
satisfactory and stable approaches to dealing with the consequences of
spills.
Parts I and II of this Article describe the scope of the insurance
coverage matches and mismatches in question. Part III is an effort to
make some sense out of the mismatches. Part IV briefly considers two
suggestions that have been made for remedying the mismatches: the
imposition of an ex ante drillers' tax on the amount of the drillers'
potential liability in excess of their combined assets and liability
insurance and the imposition of mandatory liability insurance
requirements far in excess of the amounts of insurance that are
currently available or purchased. These suggestions, however, rely on
unsubstantiated assumptions, as demonstrated in Part IV.
I. THE MATCHES

I can make quick work of the losses and liabilities that are
matched up with insurance. Although spills probably cause mainly
minor short-term bodily injury and disease, 5 health insurance covers
the medical expenses associated with this injury and disease to the
same extent as other injuries and diseases. Homeowners and
commercial property insurance cover damage to property, but-as I
will explain below-these forms of insurance are subject to exclusions
that may limit or preclude coverage for damage caused by oil spills.

5.
There also may be long-latency diseases resulting from exposure to oil or chemical
dispersants that do not manifest themselves for considerable periods after exposure and are
comparatively severe.
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The same is true of economic loss covered by business interruption
and contingent business interruption coverage.
On the liability insurance side, the typical spill defendants are
likely to be insured against liability for bodily injury, property
damage, and economic loss that is incurred "because of' bodily injury
or property damage. 6 The critical issue here, however, is the meaning
of the basic coverage requirement that such loss be "because of' bodily
injury or property damage. The application of this requirement to oilspill liabilities renders coverage uncertain.

II. FOUR IMPORTANT MISMATCHES
I focus first on two major forms of loss that are not covered by
first-party insurance: coverage of damage to residential and
commercial property under property insurance policies and business
interruption and contingent business interruption insurance for lost
profits or revenue. Then, I discuss two important forms of liability for
which coverage under liability insurance policies is uncertain:
insurance of liability for "pure" economic loss and insurance of liability
for damage to natural resources.
A. First-PartyProperty Insurance
I doubt that damage to private property, as distinguished from
natural resources, comprises a significant proportion of the harm
caused by the BP spill, although there undoubtedly has been some
damage to land, boats, and docks. But pollution of property might be
more extensive in the case of other spills, and the scope of coverage
that would be available in that event is worth considering.

6.
This insurance would also cover spill defendants' contribution and indemnity liabilities,
respecting bodily injury and property damage, to co-venturers and other similar entities and to
first-party insurers whose policyholders have causes of action against spill defendants. For
example, the insurers of Transocean, the owner of the Deepwater Horizon, have sued the
insurers of BP, the operator of the Deepwater Horizon, for a declaratory judgment that
Transocean has no liability to BP as an additional insured under Transocean's policies. See
Ranger Ins. Ltd. v. BP PLC, No. 10-2009 (S.D. Tex. June 8, 2010); Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's London v. BP PLC, No.10-1823 (S.D. Tex. May 21, 2010).
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1. Homeowners Insurance
Homeowners policies are issued to the owners of residential
7
property to cover the "risk of direct physical loss to property." Most
pollution damage affecting homeowners, however, would not be
covered by such policies. The standard-form homeowners policy, for
example, excludes coverage of loss to covered property caused by "the
discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of
pollutants" unless the discharge, etc., is itself the result of one of a
number of named perils or causes.8 The only named cause of loss that
might result in pollution is "explosion."9 But few spills are caused by
explosions or by any of the other named "perils" that are exceptions to
the exclusions in a homeowners policy, including the pollution
exclusion.10
In any event, the issue is likely to be beside the point in many
cases, because most residential property losses caused by oil spills
probably involve more damage to land than to residences or personal
property. And the standard homeowners policy expressly states that
the property insured does not include "land."11 Thus, the policy covers
neither the diminution in value of land damaged by pollution nor the
cost of remedying that damage.
2. Commercial Property Insurance
Businesses typically purchase commercial property insurance
policies that, like homeowners policies, cover the risk of direct physical
loss to property. Like homeowners policies, many such policies exclude
coverage of loss caused by pollution and do not include "land" within
the category of covered property. Some policies provide add-on
7.

KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 202 (5th ed. 2010) (setting out

the standard-form homeowners policy, including the provision quoted in the text of the "Perils
Insured Against" section of a sample homeowners policy, § I(A)(1)).
8.
Id. at 203 (quoting § I (A)(2)(c)(6)(e)).
9.
Id. at 204 (quoting § I(A)(3)). I think that the events that caused the BP spill might well
be characterized as an "explosion," although there may be room for disagreement. See, e.g.,
Graham v. Pub. Emps. Mut. Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 1077, 1081 (Wash. 1983) (holding that it was a
question of fact under a first-party property insurance policy whether damage to property from
mudflows resulting from the eruption of Mt. St. Helens was caused by "explosion").
10. These named perils are: fire or lightning; windstorm or hail; riot or civil commotion;
aircraft; vehicles; smoke; vandalism or malicious mischief; theft; falling objects; weight of ice;
snow or sleet; accidental discharge or overflow of water or steam; sudden and accidental tearing
apart, cracking, burning or bulging; freezing; sudden and accidental damage from artificially
generated electric current; and volcanic eruption. ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 204-05 (§§
I(A)(3)(1),(2),(4)-(16) of the Perils Insured Against).
11. Id. at 197 (quoting § I(B)(2)).
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coverage of the cost of remedying pollution damage to covered
property, but a comparatively low dollar sublimit often applies to such
coverage, providing much less insurance than is provided for other
forms of loss. For example, I have seen commercial property insurance
policies that provide hundreds of millions of dollars of property
insurance but only $500,000 for pollution cleanup. The standard-form
commercial property insurance policy promulgated by the Insurance
Services Office ("ISO") provides a suggested typical sublimit of
$10,000 for coverage of the cost of pollution cleanup. 12 For businesses
that suffer comparatively small amounts of pollution, this may be an
adequate amount of insurance, but where there is any substantial
amount of pollution, the cost of cleanup will likely far exceed this
sum.

13

B. First-PartyBusiness InterruptionInsurance
Along with or as a component of their commercial property
insurance, it is typical for businesses to purchase business
interruption ("BI"), or "time element," insurance. Although BI
insurance is not thoroughly standardized, the terms of coverage of
different policies are fairly similar. BI insurance covers lost profits
resulting from damage to covered property caused by an insured
peril.14 Thus, BI insurance does not cover pure economic loss but only
economic loss that results from property damage to the insured's
property when that damage is covered. If there has been no covered
physical damage to the insured's property, then there is no covered
property damage, and therefore there is no BI coverage. Further, like
homeowners policies, most commercial property insurance policies
specify that land is not insured property. When that is the case, profits
that are lost because of damage to land are not insured because the
profits are not lost as a result of covered damage to property.

12. See AM. INST. FOR CHARTERED PROP. CAS. UNDERWRITERS, THE CPCU HANDBOOK OF
INSURANCE POLICIES 101 (8th ed. 2008) [hereinafter THE CPCU HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE

POLICIES] (setting out § (A)(4)(d) containing this coverage limit).
13. Commercial property insurance policies also usually contain "sue and labor" clauses,
subject to a separate, lower sublimit, that cover the insured's cost of preventing imminent loss
that would be covered if it occurred. See ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 240-41 (describing sue and
labor coverage). If pollution was not an excluded cause of loss, these clauses might well cover the
cost of removing boats from waters in danger of pollution, or even the costs of placing booms and
other devices to prevent pollution from spreading. But because pollution is an excluded cause of
loss, sue and labor clauses probably would not apply to the prevention of imminent damage from
pollution.
14. See generally id. at 231 (describing business interruption insurance).
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A second form of coverage, contingent business interruption
("CBT") insurance, does not require damage to the insured's property.1 5
Typically, however, CBI insurance requires that there be damage to
the property of a third party such as a customer or supplier of the
insured, that the insured's economic losses result from that thirdparty property damage, and that the third-party property damage be
caused by a peril that is not excluded by the insured's policy.1 6 For this
reason, if pollution is an excluded peril under the insured's
commercial property insurance policy, then CBI insurance does not
cover economic losses resulting from the pollution of the property of a
customer or supplier. Thus, like BI insurance, CBI insurance does not
provide coverage of totally pure economic losses. 17 Obviously, this
limitation will preclude coverage of many of the economic losses that
businesses suffer as a result of oil spills.
Finally, BI and CBI policies sometimes cover loss resulting
from loss of ingress to or egress from covered property because of order
of civil authority.' 8 Some spills result in civil orders barring access to
certain areas or waters. The extent to which these orders would
trigger coverage, however, is uncertain. For example, fishermen might
be understood to be prohibited from accessing their boats if a civil
order closes access to the waters on which the boats are docked.
Fishermen might also argue that the closing of fishing grounds (for
example, in the Gulf of Mexico) constitutes denial of access to property
of a supplier, but the success of this argument would depend on

15. Id. at 232. Sometimes business interruption and contingent business interruption
insurance are provided simultaneously or in the same policy, by means of a coverage provision
requiring damage to property of the insured or to other specified property.
16. See, e.g., Duane Reade, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 279 F. Supp. 2d 235, 237
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting a policy provision requiring damage to property including but not
limited to property of customers and property of customers of customers), affd as modified, 411
F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2005); Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co. of N.Y., 936 F.
Supp. 534, 540 (S.D. 111. 1996) (quoting a policy provision requiring damage to property of a
supplier).
17. It covers only economic loss resulting from damage to third-party property on which the
insured's income is dependent. ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 232.
18. See, e.g., THE CPCU HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE POLICIES, supra note 12, at 165, § 5(a)
(setting out coverage for denial of access by civil authority). A limited form of CBI insurance is
also available for event cancellation, usually on terms similar to more general CBI coverage. I
have also seen a single reference to 'loss of turnover" insurance from remote and short-term
events, supposedly available under certain CBI coverage to such policyholders as hotels and
resorts. See Am. Bar Ass'n Teleconference: The Deepwater Oil Catastrophe - Where Are We
Now: An Update on Litigation, Economics and Significant Insurance Issues (Oct. 27, 2010).
However, in more than thirty years of experience, I have never seen another reference to such
coverage, and targeted research has been unable to identify anything further about whether, and
if so to what extent, this form of coverage is available.
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whether fish or the bodies of water in which they live constitute
"property" under a CBI insurance policy.
Even under CBI insurance policies that do not automatically
preclude coverage of loss resulting from pollution, marine life is not
literally the property of commercial fishermen, and it is not the
property of their suppliers. Policies requiring damage to property of
the insured, a customer, or a supplier might therefore be interpreted
to be inapplicable to the economic losses of commercial fishermen that
result from denial of access to their fishing grounds. Businesses whose
losses result, directly or indirectly, from the inability of commercial
fishermen to fish would face the same obstacle.
To sum up, there is a minefield of both fairly firm and other
possibly applicable limitations on BI and CBI coverage. The extent to
which BI and CBI policies would cover businesses that suffer pure
economic losses as a result of oil spills is therefore uncertain at best.
C. Insurance of Liability for Pollution-RelatedDamage and Loss
Standard-form business liability insurance policies exclude
coverage of liability caused by pollution with exceptions not relevant
here, but they virtually always also contain a blanket exclusion of
liability for the cost of cleanup and the removal of pollutants. 19 It
seems likely, however, that the most probable spill defendants
purchase customized insurance policies covering liability for pollution,
including liability for cleanup costs. 20 Some such potential defendants,
for example, are required by statute to show evidence of financial
responsibility, and the principal means of doing so is through the
21
purchase of liability insurance.
The typical liability insurance policy insures against liability
incurred "because of' bodily injury or property damage, 22 and it is
highly likely that potential spill defendants purchase customized
pollution liability insurance containing a similar provision. Under
such a provision, it is well settled that a policyholder who is held liable
for causing damage to a plaintiffs property is covered not only for that
19. ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 468 (setting out the terms of the pollution exclusion in §
(2)(f)).
20. I use the phrase "cleanup costs" to refer both to costs that are literally for cleanup as
well as "remediation" costs that involve mitigation of harm or removal of the cause of harm.
21. See, e.g., Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2716 (a), (e) (2006) (requiring responsible
parties to show evidence of financial responsibility sufficient to meet the maximum amount of

liability to which a party could be subjected under the statute and providing that showing
evidence of insurance is one method of satisfying this requirement).
22. See ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 466, 482.
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liability, but also for any liability that is imposed on the policyholder
for the plaintiffs resulting economic losses. 2 3 Liability for the cost of
cleaning up private property or government-owned property would
24
therefore fall within the terms of such coverage.
On the other hand, most parties who are not likely to be, but
nonetheless become, spill defendants do not and cannot be expected to
have insurance against liability for pollution-related damage.
Consider, for example, a plumbing contractor who negligently
performs work at a tank farm that discharges pollutants which
migrate into a nearby river or ocean. The plumbing contractor's
general liability insurance policy is unlikely to cover its liability for
property damage or cleanup, because (as noted above) standard-form
policies exclude coverage of liability for pollution, including liability
for cleanup costs.
In addition to liability for tangible property damage and
cleanup costs, spill defendants whose policies do cover liability for
pollution-related damage may face liability for "pure" economic loss
and damage to natural resources. The scope of admiralty and common
law liability for pure economic loss-that is, loss that does not result
from bodily injury or property damage suffered by the plaintiff-is not
entirely clear. The general rule is that there is no liability in
negligence for pure economic loss, and that rule should carry over at
25
least as strongly to the strict liability context.
But several landmark cases involving economic losses resulting
from pollution have articulated exceptions to this rule and permitted

23. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Gen. Time Corp., 704 F.2d 80, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1983)
(lost profits were covered consequential damages where the insured's defective electric motors
damaged valves into which they were incorporated); Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co.,
548 F.2d 681, 687 (7th Cir. 1977) ("Both the Illinois courts and this circuit have adopted the view
that, at least where property damage is defined as 'tangible' property damage, some actual injury
to 'tangible' property must be alleged before consequential damages such as loss of use may be
recovered."); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wheelwright Trucking Co., 851 So. 2d 466, 491 (Ala. 2002)
(Alabama courts "have found coverage for financial losses stemming from the loss of use of
tangible property that is related to an insured's product or work"); Fitness Equip. v. Pa. Gen. Ins.
Co., 493 So. 2d 1337, 1343 (Ala. 1986) (holding that an insurer must cover consequential
damages, including loss of profits from a canceled contract, resulting from incorporation of
insured's defective motors); Thomas J. Lipton, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 N.E.2d 37, 37-39
(N.Y. 1974) (explaining that covered damages include each of the categories of consequential
damages claimed against the insured, including "the value of [the claimant's] time in
withdrawal, recall and destruction of contaminated products; costs incurred in notification of the
trade and general public; loss of good will; and loss of profits").
24. See, e.g., A.Y. McDonald Indus. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 624 (Iowa 1991)
(holding that CERCLA cleanup costs are "damages because of... property damage" under CGL
insurance policies).
25. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 452, at 1282 (2000).
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recovery under limited circumstances. 26 The lesson of these cases is
that commercial fishermen may have a cause of action for the
economic losses they suffer as a result of ocean or river pollution.
Businesses that are directly on shore such as marinas and bait shops
may or may not have a cause of action. Commercial sellers of seafood
who are dependent on fishermen probably do not have a cause of
action. And other businesses that are indirectly affected certainly do
not have a cause of action.
In addition to common law liability, the principal statutory
source of liability for spills is the U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990
("OPA"). 27 The OPA imposes liability for damages resulting from the
discharge of oil into or upon navigable waters or adjoining
shorelines, 2 for (among other things) natural resource damages, and,
if the following are "due to" injury to property or natural resources, for
loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity, the cost of increased
public services, and lost taxes and other fees suffered by the U.S.,
29
state, and local governments.
Notice that, with the exception of natural resource damages, all
these are liabilities that tort law refers to as "pure" economic loss. But
both the common law and admiralty rules impliedly, and the OPA
26. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding a driller
liable for economic damage suffered by commercial fishermen as a result of an oil spill); Pruitt v.
Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 980 (E.D. Va. 1981) (denying a defendant chemical
corporation's motion to dismiss against plaintiffs who bought from and sold to direct users of the
polluted Chesapeake Bay).
27. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006).
28. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b). The OPA designates as a "responsible party" the lessee or permittee
of an area where an offshore facility is located. Responsible parties are strictly liable under the
OPA for "removal costs" and "damages." Removal costs consist of the cost of containing or
removing oil or other hazardous substances from water and shorelines, and other costs of
mitigating damage to wildlife and both public and private property. Damages include damages
for injury to natural resources, loss of subsistence use of natural resources, injury to property
and resulting economic loss suffered by the owner or lessee of the property, loss of profits or
impairment of earning capacity due to injury to property or natural resources (apparently
without regard to whether the claimant is the owner or lessee of the property whose injury
results in the loss), the cost of increased public services, and lost taxes and other fees suffered by
the U.S., state, and local governments resulting from injury to property. The limit of monetary
liability under the OPA for offshore facilities other than deepwater ports is the total of all
removal costs plus $75 million, unless the "incident" giving rise to the discharge was proximately
caused by gross negligence or willful misconduct or by the violation of applicable federal safety
law. 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (c)(1). Thus, in the absence of gross negligence or willful misconduct, the
responsible party is liable for a maximum of $75 million in damages for injury to natural
resources, property damage and associated economic loss, governmental loss of revenue, lost
profits and earning capacity, the cost of increased public services, and loss of subsistence use.
But even if the statutory ceiling applies, there is no limit on a responsible party's liability for
removal costs.
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expressly, require not only that the losses result from a spill, but also
that they be "due to" injury to property or natural resources. The
requirement demands that there be a nexus between injury to
property or natural resources and "pure" economic losses. There is
thus what John Goldberg has called a "second-layer" causation
requirement for recovery, and the requirement exists under all three
sources of liability.30 In Goldberg's view, there is no recovery for
economic losses under the OPA unless there is a direct connection
between injury to property or natural resources and such economic
losses. His interpretation is that businesses which lose money merely
because of a general economic downturn resulting from a spill or
because parties with whom they do business have suffered economic
loss resulting from property damage caused by a spill have no right to
recover under the OPA. This is a plausible interpretation of the OPA,
at the least.
It is not entirely certain whether satisfying the nexus
requirement-that there be a connection between the injury to
property or natural resources and the economic losses specified by the
OPA-will be sufficient to satisfy the terms of liability insurance
policies that cover liability imposed "because of ... property damage."
Arguably, an economic loss that is "due to" injury to property resulting
from a spill is a loss that occurs "because of' property damage, as
required by liability insurance policies.3 1 I have been unable to
discover any directly applicable case law on the issue. The reason, of
course, is that liability for such loss has been so rarely imposed that
there apparently have been no cases addressing whether insurance
policies cover this form of liability. But, in analogous contexts, there is
undoubtedly coverage, even if the party suffering physical damage is
not the party who recovers from the policyholder for economic losses.
For example, I have no doubt that monetary losses awarded to the
survivors of a decedent pursuant to a wrongful death statute would
qualify as damages "because of bodily injury" under a commercial
general liability ("CGL") insurance policy. Consequently, I am

30. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC Loss IN CONNECTION WITH THE
DEEPWATER HORIZON
SPILL 17 (2010), available at http:/flawprofessors.typepad.com

files/goldberg.report-on-economic-loss-liability- 11-22-10.pdf.
31. Liability insurance policies typically define "property damage" to mean not only
physical damage to tangible property, but also loss of use of tangible property that is not
physically injured. However, few if any of the common law, admiralty, and OPA liabilities would
seem to be imposed for loss of use of tangible property. Consequently, whether insurance claims
for coverage of liability for pure economic loss would be "because of' loss of use of tangible
property that is not physically injured does not seem relevant here.
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reasonably confident that there would be coverage of OPA liability for
lost profits "due to" damage to property.
Similarly, the OPA imposes liability for damages suffered by
the United States, a state, or a political subdivision thereof for loss of
taxes, royalties, rents, fees, or net profit shares "due to the injury,
destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural
resources." 32 With the exception of losses due to damage to natural
resources, presumably this provision would be interpreted in pari
materia with the provision governing private parties' pure economic
losses, since the two provisions are worded nearly identically. The
result would be that liability insurance policies would cover, or fail to
cover, each of these items of damages to the same extent.
It is not entirely clear, however, whether damages awarded
under the OPA for injury to natural resources or for economic loss
"due to" injury or damage to natural resources would be considered
damages "because of ... property damage." That depends on whether
natural resources are "property." For example, plants growing on
public land such as seashores or wetlands are property because a
governmental unit owns them. Rivers and oceans within at least the
twelve-nautical-mile territorial limit probably are "property" because
the government owns them as parens patriaeor trustee for the public.
Damages imposed for injury or damage to these resources would
probably be considered damages "because of . . . property damage"
under liability insurance policies. On the other hand, it is less clear
whether birds, animals that inhabit public land, and marine lifeespecially outside the twelve-mile territorial limit-are "property" if
no one owns them. If they are not property, then damages imposed for
injury or damage to these natural resources are not "because of'
property damage, and damages for economic loss "due to" injury or
damage to these natural resources are not "because of' property
damage.
Analogous issues might arise in connection with any liability
that might be imposed for the cost of medical monitoring of those who
are exposed to pollutants but have not yet suffered injury. As I noted,
virtually all general liability insurance policies cover liability imposed
"because of' bodily injury and property damage. Bodily injury tends to
33
be defined as "bodily injury, sickness or disease ... including death."
Further, the insurance applies only to bodily injury that occurs

32. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(D).
33. See ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 466-67 (setting out this language in the Insuring
Agreement, § 1(a)).
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"during the policy period." Consequently, there is a question of
whether liability for medical monitoring costs is imposed "because of.
• . bodily injury" when there has been no evidence that the parties
seeking such costs have already suffered cellular or subcellular injury.
III. EXPLAINING THE MISMATCHES
One would think that, at least prima facie, there would be
demand for the various forms of insurance that I noted in Part II are
not available. It is therefore natural to look for explanations for the
absence of such insurance. In this Part, I discuss three explanations:
difficulties associated with proving the cause of pure economic losses;
the traditional problems associated with insuring against pollutionrelated losses and liability; and the absence of a need for insurance of
34
highly capitalized potential defendants.
A. Difficulties Associated with Proving the Cause of Pure Economic
Loss
I showed in Part II that BI and CBI insurance policies limit
coverage to losses resulting from damage to property of the insured or
of a customer or a supplier, respectively. The reason, I think, is that
insurers do not wish to and could not insure against losses resulting
from general economic decline. Consequently, BI and CBI policies
must find a way to insure some economic losses, but not all. The
method they have arrived at only covers those economic losses that
result from property damage to property owned by the insured (BI) or
by a third party (CBI).
Proving the amount of economic losses that result from
property damage is itself sometimes a considerable challenge. The
very term that the insurance world applies to the valuation of such
losses-"adjustment"-suggests that the process is not and cannot be
entirely objective or mechanistic. One reason proof of causation in this
context is sometimes difficult is because all proof of causation is
counterfactual; it entails showing what would have happened if the
putative cause had not materialized. In the case of economic losses,
lost profits equal expected profits minus actual profits. Proving this
requires proving what the insured's profits would have been but for
the cause of loss. Some businesses are new and have no profit history
34. A possible additional explanation that I have considered and largely rejected is that
pollution produces correlated losses. Although this is true for oil spills, it is not true for most
other pollution events, which tend to be sporadic and isolated even if of significant magnitude.
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on which to base proof. Others have a history but kept inadequate
records. And even for firms with a history and good records,
estimating what future profits would have been is sometimes
speculative, especially if there have been intervening factors (e.g., bad
weather) that would have affected profits even if there had not been
property damage.
A second reason why proving causation for purposes of BI and
CBI coverage is sometimes difficult is because an insured event may
cause both direct economic losses and general economic decline. For
example, large-scale oil spills not only cause damage to the property of
the insured and the property of customers and suppliers. They may
also cause general economic downturns in the regions where they
occur, as the BP spill did. Disaggregating (a) the profits or revenues
lost because of property damage to the insured, a customer, or a
supplier from (b) the losses resulting from the accompanying general
economic downturn may be a significant challenge. BI and CBI
policyholders in lower Manhattan encountered similar problems of
proof after the events of September 11, 2001. 35 All these problems of
proof are significant in themselves.
Nonetheless, the limitation of coverage to losses caused by
property damage is in theory unduly narrow. However, in order to
expand coverage but still avoid insuring against losses resulting from
general economic decline, another approach would be required. If BI
and CBI policies did not require a causal connection between property
damage and economic losses, then the policies would have to identify
and define an alternative set of natural and man-made events that
would constitute covered causes of loss. Conceivably, a limited set of
natural catastrophes that would trigger coverage, even apart from any
connection between property damage and a particular policyholder's
losses, could be identified; for example, the list could include
hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, and snowstorms. The list would be
underinclusive, but even this abbreviated list might press the limits of
the insurability of economic losses. Hurricanes and floods, for
example, sometimes cause very significant economic decline, and
insurers' ability to insure against the losses resulting generally from
such events-at least for premiums that policyholders would be
willing to pay-is questionable.
35. See, e.g., Duane Reade, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 279 F. Supp. 2d 235, 23840 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that the insurance policy in question required due consideration both
to the experience of a drug store that had been destroyed by the 9111 attack on the World Trade
Center and to the probable experience thereafter had no loss occurred), affd as modified, 411
F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2005).
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Even if this were feasible, however, it is difficult to imagine
identifying and defining a suitably inclusive, corresponding set of
man-made events whose occurrence would trigger coverage when
those events caused economic losses. One hardly knows where to
begin: oil spills, plane crashes, building collapses, and explosions?
What else? This list does not even begin to exhaust the possible causes
of general economic loss resulting from a single event. Moreover, the
connection between the occurrence of one of the specified natural or
man-made events that would trigger coverage and the loss of profits or
revenues these events would cause would have to be susceptible to
practical proof. But the problems associated with proving a causal
connection between these events and the loss of profits or revenue
suffered by policyholders would be exponentially greater than the
problems involved in proving a causal connection between property
damage and economic losses. Some sort of "proximate" cause test
would be required, or businesses throughout the country would
potentially be covered when a decline in economic conditions resulting
from an event in one part of the country had an impact in another part
of the country. The prospect of such coverage claims would pose a factfinding nightmare. Instead, the requirement that loss be caused by
damage to the property of the insured, a customer, or a supplier in
effect adopts a bright-line proxy for proximate cause.
All this pertains to first-party insurance. On the liability
insurance side, there is also a required connection between property
damage and coverage. As I noted earlier, under virtually all relevant
liability insurance policies, there is insurance of liability for damages
imposed "because of' property damage. One explanation for this
liability insurance requirement is partly analogous to the explanation
for the corresponding first-party insurance requirement: in the
absence of the requirement, the policy would have to identify another
basis for triggering coverage, or the policy would insure all monetary
liability that the policyholder ever incurred. Obviously, insurers do not
wish to, nor could they, insure against all of an insured's monetary
liabilities. Like first-party insurers, liability insurers therefore need a
basis for limiting the scope of coverage of liability for economic loss,
and requiring that such loss be the consequence of property damage
provides that basis.
In addition, I think that the requirement that liability be
incurred for damages "because of' property damage is keyed as nearly
as possible to the scope of liability for pure economic loss that exists in
modern tort law. As long as the liability for economic loss remains
very limited, there is no need to relax the "because of' requirement in
liability insurance. And as I have shown elsewhere, if liability
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insurance policies did relax the "because of' requirement, it might well
be that tort liability for pure economic loss would expand to take
advantage of this newly available insurance. 36 Neither insurers nor
policyholders who are potential defendants have any incentive to
encourage that kind of development.
B. The PollutionInsurancePredicament
For several decades, insurers have been especially reluctant to
insure against loss or liability resulting from pollution. As a
consequence, all sorts of insurance policies contain exclusions from or
limitations on coverage for pollution-related loss and liability.3 7 We
saw this in connection with all three forms of coverage discussed in
Part II: first-party property insurance, BI and CBI coverage, and
standard-form liability insurance. There are several reasons for
insurers' concern about insuring against pollution and for the
consequent limitations on coverage in both first-party and third-party
insurance.
1. Moral Hazard
There may well be an excessive amount of moral hazard
associated with insuring against gradually occurring pollution. While
abrupt events that result in pollution are as likely to be accidental as
other injury-causing occurrences, gradually occurring pollution may be
different. Companies are more likely to detect and therefore control
gradually occurring pollution while it takes place. Insuring against
pollution, however, may diminish the insured's incentive to detect
pollution while it is occurring or to take steps to mitigate damage once
pollution is detected.
The solution to this problem would be to cover loss or liability
resulting from abrupt but not gradual pollution. But, as I explain
next, the insurance industry tried that solution several decades ago
and (from its standpoint) failed.

36. See ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 171-97 (noting that courts did not impose certain
liabilities until homeowners policies contained insurance that would cover them).
37. For an account of the developments that led to the exclusion of pollution coverage from
standard-form liability insurance policies, see Am. States Ins. Co. v. Kolums, 687 N.E.2d 72, 7882 (Ill. 1997).
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2. Juridical Risk
Forty years ago, insurers introduced a "qualified" pollution
exclusion into general liability insurance policies. The exclusion
precluded coverage unless the discharge of pollutants was "sudden
and accidental." Over the ensuing two decades, about half of the
courts interpreting this exclusion ruled that the term "sudden" was
ambiguous and could mean "unexpected." Under the doctrine contra
proferentem, which directs that ambiguous contract language be
interpreted against its drafter, 38 these courts held that the exclusion
did not preclude coverage of liability for gradual, unexpected
pollution. 39 In effect, "sudden" could mean "gradual."
The insurance industry regarded this interpretation as resultoriented and wholly inconsistent with the intended meaning of the
exclusion. As a consequence, insurers inserted an "absolute" pollution
exclusion in the standard-form CGL insurance policy. The memory of
judicial
considered
with
what
insurers
experience
their
misinterpretation of the "sudden and accidental" exception to the
pollution exclusion has persisted. Insurers are wary of insuring
against pollution-related loss or liability without placing very
determinate limits on what they cover. And they are fearful that, if
they did provide even limited pollution coverage, their experience with
the qualified pollution exclusion would be repeated, and courts would
misinterpret the limitations the insurers attempted to include in their
40
coverage.
3. Trigger of Coverage Uncertainties
Because so much pollution is gradual, the time when it causes
injury or damage is sometimes uncertain. Yet, all first-party insurance
policies and occurrence-based liability insurance policies are
"triggered," or activated, by the occurrence of injury or damage during

38. See ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 160-61 (noting that contra preferentum was a "major
policyholder weapon" in pollution liability insurance litigation).
39. See ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 574-75 (demonstrating that roughly half of the courts
that have considered the issue have ruled that " 'sudden' does not necessarily have a temporal
component and . . . the exclusion . . . does not preclude coverage of liability for unintentional,

gradual pollution").
40. See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance, 87 VA.
L. REV. 85, 97-98 (2001) (explaining insurance industry's decision to absolutely bar coverage of
pollution-related harm after some courts interpreted qualified protection expansively).
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the policy period. 41 Insuring against pollution-related loss or liability
therefore risks generating factual and legal disputes about the policy
year or years that are responsible for coverage. Excluding coverage of
pollution-related loss or liability avoids this problem.
4. The High Cost of Pollution Cleanup
Even if pollution only contaminates soil, a small amount of
pollution can cost a considerable sum to clean up. Moreover, once
pollutants contact groundwater lying underground, the cost of cleanup
can be a vast multiple of the value of the property where the pollution
occurred. The cost of cleaning up pollution of surface waters such as
rivers and oceans is also extraordinarily high.4 2 As a result, there is
likely to be a much higher proportion of complete losses in first-party
insurance, and of liability equal to the policy limits in liability
insurance, if pollution is covered. Therefore, even when the risk of
pollution is small, the insurers' exposure when covered pollution
occurs will likely often equal the amount of coverage it has provided.
This helps explain the exclusion of coverage for damage to land
in homeowners and commercial property insurance policies, as well as
the presence in some commercial property insurance policies of low
sublimits of insurance for the cost of pollution cleanup. It probably
would make sense for homeowners insurance to provide a low sublimit
of coverage for damage to land and for pollution cleanup. But doing so
would complicate what is otherwise a simple statement of the amount
of coverage and would face regulatory obstacles as well.
In a sense, the high cost of cleanup also helps to explain how
potential spill defendants are able to obtain insurance against liability
for cleanup costs. In contrast to ordinary policyholders, whose
operations pose a series of different risks, the principal risk that
potential spill defendants face is liability for cleanup costs. When this
is the principal risk being underwritten, rather than a low-probability,
high-magnitude risk that is just one risk in a large portfolio of risks
that the policy covers, it is more feasible for an insurer to set a
premium that accurately reflects the insurer's exposure.

41. For discussion of the difference between occurrence-based and claims-made liability
insurance policies, see ABRAHAM, supranote 7, at 588.
42. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND
POLICY 438 (6th ed. 2009) (noting that per-site cleanup costs average $15 to $30 million).
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C. Liabilityfor CatastrophicLoss and the Uses of Portfolio
Diversification
The risk of pollution-related harm is a prime example of a lowprobability risk with catastrophic potential magnitude if it
materializes. This is precisely the kind of risk that potential
defendants should wish to insure. The absence of such insurance for
small enterprises can be explained by the factors I have just discussed.
But the largest enterprises are likely to cause the largest losses and
incur the largest liabilities and therefore are likely to be most in need
of insurance. Why don't very large enterprises, who have considerable
assets at stake and the apparent buying power necessary to elicit a
supply of coverage, have pollution insurance?
I earlier noted that some potential spill defendants probably do
have insurance that covers them against some pollution liability.
Interestingly, however, very large enterprises often do not need full
insurance against their potential pollution liability. The very fact that
BP was able to set up and self-fund a $20 billion compensation fund to
pay for the losses caused by the BP spill is some confirmation of this
supposition.
In fact, it is not clear that enterprises of BP's size need to buy
liability insurance at all in order to protect themselves against
potential civil liability. The shareholders of such enterprises already
are, or are capable of being, sufficiently diversified in their
investments, so that the purchase of liability insurance by the
enterprises in which shareholders have invested-another form of risk
diversification-is not necessary for this purpose. In fact, my
experience confirms this insight. Even the largest business enterprises
are covered by less than a billion dollars worth of liability insurance,
and sometimes considerably less, for their civil liabilities. They are in
effect self-insured for the vast majority of their potential catastrophic
liability.
The puzzle, therefore, is not so much why there are gaps in the
comparatively small liability insurance programs covering these
companies-for which I have just provided explanations-but rather,
why they have liability insurance at all. Why do companies with $50
billion or more in annual revenues routinely bother to make an annual
purchase of roughly $500 million of liability insurance, equal to no
more than one percent of their annual revenues? The answer
obviously is not that they need the insurance to protect themselves
against liability. Rather, there are a number of other answers. First,
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statutory or regulatory mandates sometimes require the purchase of
liability insurance. 43 Second, having liability insurance smoothes out a
company's balance sheet by moderating quarter-to-quarter variations
in profitability as a result of variation in the company's civil
liabilities. 44 Third, the failure to purchase liability insurance might
become the subject of a shareholder derivative suit in the event that
the company incurs significant liability, and it is easier to purchase
the insurance than to explain to a lay jury why insurance was not, and
need not have been, purchased. 45 Finally, a company's managers, who
play an important role in deciding whether to purchase liability
insurance and how much to purchase, often have a significant
p!roportion of their assets invested in the company's stock or options
and are not as diversified in their investments as shareholders.
Managers therefore may have a greater interest in protecting their
company-specific investments through the purchase of liability
insurance. 46 In short, it turns out that liability insurance gaps and
mismatches are probably beside the point with respect to many of the
largest and most devastating oil spills.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF

Two REFORM PROPOSALS

Two contributions to this Issue make proposals for reform that
may have insurance implications. In this Part, I will briefly analyze
these implications. The first proposal, by Viscusi and Zeckhauser,
recommends creating a prospective liability scheme under which
drillers should be taxed for uncapped, expected liabilities beyond the
amount that they will be able to pay. 47 The second proposal, by Cohen
and coauthors, recommends mandating the purchase of liability

43. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2716 (2006) (requiring vessels using waters
under U.S. jurisdiction to maintain evidence of financial responsibility to meet maximum
amount of possible liability under the OPA).
44. See ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 233-34 (noting that doing so could prevent the securities
market from overreacting to a sudden liability charge).
45. Id. at 234 (citing Tom Baker & Sean Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate

Governance: The Directors'andOfficers'LiabilityInsurer,951bEO. L.J. 1795, 1834 (2007)):
46. See TOM BAKER & SEAN GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT CONDUCT 73-74
(2011) (noting also that D&O insurance's ability to protect a company's financial statements from
"shocks" of shareholder litigation, and a manager's reliance on strong financial statements for job

security and compensation packages, provide incentives for abnormally high purchases of D&O
insurance by managers).
47. W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Deterring and Compensating Oil-Spill

Catastrophes:The Need for Strict and Two-Tier Liability, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1717, 1721-22 (2011).
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insurance, apparently in amounts in excess of $10 billion, as a
48
condition of involvement in drilling activities.
A. Prospective Excess Liability
Prospective liability would be imposed by taxing drillers based
on the amount of liability they might incur, apparently in excess of
their assets plus their liability insurance. The proceeds of the tax
would be placed in a compensation fund, which could then be used to
pay liabilities that a driller itself could not pay. 49 Because Viscusi and
Zeckhauser would limit liability to the single enterprise engaged in
drilling, this proposal is unlikely to have any direct insurance
implications. As I noted earlier, the very largest enterprises currently
buy liability insurance that covers only a small percentage of their
potential liability for catastrophic oil spills, but standard-form liability
excludes coverage of liability for damage caused by pollution.
Prospective liability would not directly affect this state of affairs.
In fact, the underlying purpose of the prospective liability
proposal is not entirely clear. The tax the proposal contemplates would
force the large enterprises who engage in drilling (the only enterprises
who would face liability under the proposal) to internalize that
additional increment of the potential costs their activities could cause
that exceeds their liability insurance plus their net worth. Because the
probability that this increment of losses would occur would be very
low, however, if the tax were actuarially accurate, it probably would
be comparatively small. It therefore seems unlikely that the threat of
tax liability would have much impact on the decision to drill. For
example, consider the impact on BP of a tax based on the probability
that it would be responsible for damages caused by a spill in excess of
its net worth of roughly $100 billion. Since the probability that such
losses would occur would be tiny, an actuarially accurate tax would be
correspondingly small. Moreover, unless the tax were calibrated to
each individual enterprise's past loss experience or based on a current
assessment of the quality of each driller's equipment and conduct-an
approach that would be extremely difficult for the government to
undertake and that might in any event render it something other than
a tax-the prospect of paying the tax would affect only the decision of
48. Mark A. Cohen et al., Deepwater Drilling: Law, Policy, and Economics of Firm
Organizationand Safety, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1853, 1898-900 (2011).
49. See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 1723 (arguing that such a taxation plan
will decrease the chances of uncompensated loss, prevent drillers from taking excessive risks,
and shift oversight responsibility away from government regulators and to drillers themselves).
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whether to drill, not the degree of care with which drilling actually
occurs.
Similarly, if prospective liability taxes were actuarially
accurate, then for many years the assets of the compensation fund
comprised of these taxes might well be grossly insufficient to provide
compensation for losses caused by any spill that exceeded a driller's
net worth plus insurance. If a catastrophically large spill occurred
during the early years of the prospective liability system, then the
ostensible guarantee of full compensation that the existence of the
fund would offer to potential victims might therefore be redeemable
only out of general revenue-a possibility that would be controversial
in the current political and economic climate.
B. Mandatory Liability Insurance
A second proposal, by Cohen and his coauthors, would require
that enterprises involved in drilling purchase liability insurance in
amounts in excess of $10 to $20 billion.5 0 The authors of this proposal
are admirably candid in acknowledging that the insurance industry
may not be able to supply this much coverage and that the intensified
monitoring by the industry that the proposal contemplates may not
occur.

51

These are indeed the two problems with the proposal. First, as
I noted earlier, even the largest enterprises involved in offshore
drilling currently purchase only a small percentage of the amount of
liability insurance that the proposal would require. It is by no means
clear that such a vast increase in the amount of insurance demanded
would be met by a corresponding supply. While it is true that the
global capital markets are in the abstract amply supplied to provide
this coverage, an increase of some two-thousand percent or more in
the amount of liability insurance that insured enterprises must
purchase would be unprecedented. The authors cite the insurance
industry's warnings before the enactment and reauthorization of the
Response,
Compensation, and
Environmental
Comprehensive
Liability Act ("CERCLA") that the industry could not supply pollution
insurance as evidence that the industry sometimes raises "unfounded

50. Cohen et al., supra note 48, at 1901 (citing Press Release, Munich Re, Munich Re
Develops New Insurance Solution for Oil Catastrophes (Sept. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.munichre.com/en/media relations/press-releases/2010/2010_09_12-press-release.asp
51.

Id.

2011]

CATASTROPHIC OIL SPILLS AND INSURANCE

1791

concerns." 52 This argument, however, actually seems to me to cut the
other way. The insurance industry actually eliminated pollution
insurance from its standard-form liability insurance policies after the
enactment of CERCLA, and that coverage has never been restored.
Second, insurers have never been as rigorous in monitoring the
conduct of their policyholders as many observers have supposed.
Insurers selling liability insurance to corporate directors and officers,
for example, do almost nothing to monitor the behavior of the
corporations that they insure, 53 despite the apparent advantage that
they could seemingly gain by doing so. Legally requiring a vast
increase in the amount of insurance purchased by enterprises
associated with offshore drilling, at least partially in order to enlist
the risk management services of insurers, would place confidence in
an insurance industry reaction that its past conduct does not warrant.
The whole idea that there could be effective surrogate regulation
through insurance to offset the deficiencies of direct, governmental
regulation depends on assumptions about the future capacities and
incentives of insurers that are as yet undemonstrated.
CONCLUSION
Catastrophic oil spills threaten to cause widespread loss. Yet
neither first-party nor third-party insurance provides sufficient
coverage of the losses or liabilities that result from such spills. While
there are explanations for the gaps between these losses and liabilities
and the insurance available to cover them, these explanations are
likely to provide little consolation to those who find themselves
uninsured. Prominent proposals responding in part to these gaps may
have some advantages, but they rely on questionable assumptions
about their impact on the behavior of drillers and insurers.

Id. at 1901 n.200.
53. See, e.g., BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 46, at 109 (discussing lack of conditioning sale
of insurance on compliance with loss-prevention requirements in a systemic way, limited value
placed by public corporations on nonbinding loss-prevention advice given by insurers, and
absence of active management of defense costs by insurers).
52.

